The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company v C.A, G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    The private respondent opened a savings account with the petitioner.  The private respondent, through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up a savings deposit slip and saving check deposit slip. Macaraya instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit the money with the petitioner. Macaraya also gave Calapre the passbook. Calapre deposited the amount to the petitioner since the transaction took time and he had to make another deposit with a different bank, he left the passbook with the petitioner. When Calapre returned to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that "somebody got the passbook". Calapre reported it to Macaraya. Macaraya then deposited another amount with the petitioner, when she asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told her that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. The private respondent then called up the petitioner to stop any transactions using the same lost passbook until they could open a new account. On the same day, the private respondent learned that an unauthorized withdrawal was made from its savings account. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of the private respondent. The signatories denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the amount from the unauthorized withdrawal.

Issue:

    WoN the petitioner is negligent and liable for damages?

Ruling:

 (Artilcle 1172; 1173)

    Yes, the petitioner is negligent and liable for damages.

    The petitioner breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of the private respondent.

    For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to the depositor. (Art. 1172)

    The petitioner is bound by the negligence of its employee under the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.

Note:

    The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on a simple loan. (Art. 1980)

    In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.

Doctrine of last clear chance

    - where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to do so, is chargeable with the loss; also called contributory negligence; applicable to culpa aquiliana

San Pedro Bus Lines v Navarro, G.R. No. L-6291, April 29, 1954 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    Navarro is a passenger of one of the buses owned and operated by the petitioner. While on its way to its destination, the bus collided with another vehicle, causing serious physical injuries with subsequent post-traumatic psychosis which might incapacitate the respondent for life. In their answer, the petitioner admitted the occurrence of the accident and the injuries received by the respondent but disclaimed responsibility for the accident. The petitioner also contends that they cannot be held civilly liable for the reason that the Court of First Instance had dismissed the criminal charges against the driver of the bus involved in the accident.

Issue:

    WoN the petitioner is liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1172, 1173)

    Yes, the petitioner is liable for damages.

    The action was not based on tort or quasi-delict but was one for breach of a carrier's contract, there being a clear distinction between culpa as a source and creator of obligations (aquiliana) and culpa in the performance of an already existing obligation (contractual).

Del Prado v Manila Electric, Co., G.R. No. L-29462, March 7, 1929 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    The respondent is engaged in operating streetcars for the conveyance of passengers. Teodoro Florenciano, a motorman, after the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting passengers off, it resumed its course at a moderate speed. The car had only proceeded a short distance when the petitioner ran across the street to catch the car, upon approaching the car he raised his hand as an indication to the motorman to his desire to board the car, in response the motorman ease up a little without stopping. The petitioner seized with his hand the front perpendicular handspot at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform, however, before he had secured himself, the motorman applied the power with the result that the car lurches forward slightly. This sudden impulse caused the petitioner to slip and fell to the ground having his right foot caught and crushed by the moving car which eventually was amputated.

Issue:

    WoN the respondent is negligent and liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1172; 1173)

    Yes, the respondent is negligent and liable for damages.

    The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty. This duty extends to patrons boarding as well as those alighting therefrom. (culpa contractual)

Note:

culpa aquiliana  

    - liability arising from a tort; not involving a breach of a positive obligation; an employer may exculpate himself by providing that he exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; the court can mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the case

Manuel De Guia v The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, G.R. No. L-14335 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    The petitioner, a physician, boarded a car at the end of the line with the intention of coming to the city. At about thirty meters from the starting point, the car entered a switch, the petitioner remaining on the back of the platform holding the handle of the right-hand door. Upon coming out of the switch, the small wheels of the rear car left the track, ran for a short distance, and struck a concrete post. As the car stopped, the petitioner was thrown against the door, receiving bruises and possible internal injuries. The trial court found that the motorman was negligent for having maintained too rapid a speed. On the other hand, the respondent insisted that the derailment of the car is supposed to be due to a fortuitous event and not the negligence of the motorman, i.e. a stone lodged between the rails at the juncture of the switch, unobserved by the motorman.

Issue:

    WoN the respondent is liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1172)

    Yes, the respondent is liable for damages.

    The petitioner had boarded the car as a passenger for the city of Manila and the company undertook to convey him for hire. The relation between the parties was, therefore, of a contractual nature, and the duty of the carrier is to be determined with reference to the principles of contract law, i.e. the company was bound to convey and deliver the petitioner safely and securely with reference to the degree of care, which, under the circumstances, is required by law and custom applicable to the case. (culpa contractual)

Note:

culpa aquiliana

    - relevant to prove that the company exercise due care in the selection and instruction of the motorman; liability incurred by  negligence in the absence of a contractual relation

Gutierrez v Gutierrez, G.R. No. 34840, Septembet 23, 1931 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    The case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow down and give the right of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.

    A passenger truck and a private automobile collided while attempting to pass each other on a bridge. The truck was driven by Abelardo Velasco and owned by Saturnino Cortez. The private automobile was operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad, 18 years of age, owned by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the vehicle, the mother along with the other members of the family. seven in total were accommodated. A passenger of the truck, petitioner herein, was en route to Manila. The collision resulted in the petitioner suffering a fractured right leg. It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence. The difference is, the petitioner blames both parties; the owner of the passenger truck blames the private automobile; and the private automobile blames the passenger truck.

Issue:

    WoN the private automobile and passenger truck are liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1172)

    Yes, both are liable.

    Civil liability arising from fault or negligence.

    (Private vehicle)

    The running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.

    (Passenger truck)

    Liability rests on that of a contract.

Spouses Guanio v Makati Shangrila, G.R. No. 190601, Feb. 7, 2011 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    For their wedding, the petitioner spouses booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati. Prior to the event, the parties agreed on a final price on the food to be served during the wedding reception. A day before the event, the parties finalized and forged their contract. The petitioners claim that the respondent failed to honor their agreement as stated in the contract. Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received an apologetic reply from the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages. In its answer, the respondent claimed that the petitioner failed to inform the former of the change in the expected number of guest which led to the poor service.

Issue:

    WoN respondent failed to honor their contract?

Ruling:

(Article 1170; 1171; 1338; 1344)

    No, the respondents did not fail to honor their contract.

    Breach of contract is defined as the failure without a legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.

    The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform the respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the parties’ contract provides, the respondent from liability for "any damage or inconvenience" occasioned thereby. As for petitioners’ claim that respondent departed from its verbal agreement with petitioners, the same fails, given that the written contract which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law between them.

    In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the event. 

(Alternative)

Issue:

    WoN the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable to the case?

Ruling:

    No, the doctrine of proximate cause is no applicable.

    The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

Legaspi Oil v CA, G.R. No. 96505, July 1, 1993 CASE DIGEST

Facts:

    The case involves the sale of copra by Oseraos to the petitioner. A signed contract on behalf of Oseraos was entered into by both parties whereby Oseraos shall deliver to the petitioner the said copras. Oseraos failed to deliver the whole volume of copra he was obliged to deliver. The petitioner demanded the delivery of said copras but Oseraos refused because the prices of copra had gone up from the time they had entered into the contract.

Issue:

    WoN Oseraos' failure to deliver the copra is the fraud referred to by Article 1170?

Ruling:

(Article 1170; 1171; 1338; 1344)

    Yes, Oseraos' failure to deliver the copra is the fraud referred to by Article 1170.

    The fraud referred to in Article 1170 is the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of the obligation. The conduct of Oseraos clearly manifests his deliberate intent to evade his contractual obligation for the price of copra had gone up.

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Juan Syquia v CA, G.R. No. 98695, Jan. 27, 1993 CASE DIGEST

 Facts:

     The petitioner filed a complaint against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for the damage caused against the deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia's remains buried in said memorial park. The damage caused happened upon the removal, for transfer on a different plot of land, of the deceased remains. The damage became apparent upon the opening the vault where the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding; the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth, and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; and the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth. Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration of the deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of defendants gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault petitioners filed this complaint.

Issue:

    WoN the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is liable for damages?

Ruling:

(Article 1170; 1171; 1338; 1344)

    No, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is not liable for damages.

    There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.

PNCC v NLRC, G.R. No. 81551, April 27, 1989 CASE DIGEST

 Facts:

    Petitioner and Nicolas Saceda entered into a contract of employment for two years. On January 8, 1984, Saceda completed his contract and the petitioner extended it to January 27, 1984. On February 9, 1984, Saceda was dispatched to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia for immediate repatriation to the Philippines. He was first booked on February 21, 1984, however, Saceda refused to depart because he wanted to wait for the final disposition on the complaint he filed against the petitioner for the payment of his bonus, unused vacation/sick leave, and unpaid wages from December 1, 1983 up to January 27, 1984. The decision of the Saudi labor authorities which was favorable to Saceda was rendered on March 24, 1984. Saceda agreed to be repatriated on March 27, 1984, after the petitioner paid him the award granted by the Saudi labor authorities. Upon his arrival, he found out that 70% of his salary for the period November 16, 1983 to January 15, 1984 was not paid by the petitioner. Saceda then filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for non-payment of salary and stand-by pay corresponding to January 27, 1984 to March 27, 1984. He claimed that he was not repatriated soon upon the termination of his contract but was made to wait and remain idle for two months.

Issue:

    WoN the stand-by pay be paid to Saceda?

Ruling:

(Article 1170; 1171; 1338; 1344)

    Yes. It was the petitioners obligation to get Saceda's travel documents ready for his termination of the contract, the petitioner must answer in damages for the delay in Saceda's departure which compelled him to stand-by idle and jobless in a foreign land while waiting for his employer to hand him his ticket and travel papers for his trip home.