Villegas, et. al. v CA, G.R. Nos. 82562 and 82592, April 11, 1997 CASE DIGEST

 Facts:

    This case originated from a libel suit filed by Antonio V. Raquiza against Antonio J. Villegas, who denied the charge. Villegas left for the United States where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. The trial proceeded on absentia by the time of his death. The prosecution had already rested its case two months after his death. The court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserved the right to resolve its civil aspect. The lower court ordered the estate of Villegas to pay civil damages with regard to the offence. The heirs of Villegas appealed the decision whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the trials courts' judgement, modified only with respect to the award of damages.

Issue:

    WoN the death of Villegas before final judgement extinguished his civil liability?

Ruling:

(Article 1162; 2176; 2180; RPC Art. 103)

    Yes, the death of Villegas before final judgement extinguished his civil liability.

    The source of Villegas's civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or omission complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused died shortly after the prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to submit his memorandum and all this before any decision could even be reached by the trial court.

    However, the enforcement of a deceased accused's civil liability is dependent on two factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a criminal case such as this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action was impliedly instituted with it?

    Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions against Villegas which dismissal will not, however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim for damages against the executor or administrator of the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil separate civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.